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Ivan Dinev Ivanov1 
 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a profound transformation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO): the introduction of new missions designed to meet the new demands 
in international security, the development of allied capabilities to execute these missions, and the 
incorporation of a dozen new allies from Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, NATO’s 
increased role in international security led to enhanced cooperation not only with its former 
adversaries, but also with other nations around the globe that were interested in expanding 
cooperation with the organization. In the course of the last two decades, NATO developed a 
number of partnerships with nations from the Caucuses, Central Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa, and even the Pacific Rim. The 2010 Strategic Concept recognized that the wide network of 
partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe is intended to “further 
promote Euro-Atlantic security” as these partnerships make a “concrete and valued contribution to 
the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.”2 
How do NATO’s relationships with its new members and partners affect these nations’ decisions to 
participate in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarian operations? This study surveys the 
involvement of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic partners (EAPs) and new members in various international 
operations; it argues that the alliance’s success in drawing new participants into international 
operations is largely determined by three different groups of variables: (1) the prospects for 
membership; (2) the presence of unresolved disputes with neighboring countries and; (3) the degree 
of internal political divisions in these transitional societies. This article will examine these three 
variables. First, it will show that when NATO upgraded its relationship with prospective members 
and signaled high chances for membership, these nations significantly increased their participation in 
international operations. Second, it will discuss how the presence of unresolved conflicts could 
effectively paralyze integration into NATO as was the case of Macedonia and Georgia thus 
constraining these countries’ involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, it will illustrate how deep political 
divisions in Ukraine led to a plummeting public approval for membership and subsequent 
withdrawal of support for NATO-led operations. The three variables together point to the 
conclusion that the alliance was overall fairly effective in persuading the new members to participate 
more actively in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian missions. At the same time, it has 
had a mixed record in engaging its Euro-Atlantic partners (EAP) to become involved in various 
international efforts. Although NATO’s incentives have facilitated EAPs’ contributions to 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian missions, these incentives have not always proven 
sufficient to overcome neighbors’ opposition or domestic resistance to membership. 
                                                
1 The author wishes to thank Dinshaw Mistry, Michael Schoeder, Carrie-Jo Coaplen, Richard Harknett and the 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. He is also grateful to 
the graduate students at the University of Cincinnati for their assistance with this research and insightful feedback. 
2 “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 November 2010, Lisbon, Portugal. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-
2010-eng.pdf (accessed May 30, 2011). 
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Explaining the Impact of NATO Membership and Partnerships 
In the course of the past two decades, NATO managed to develop an advanced web of partnerships 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the now defunct North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
that was created in 1991 and replaced in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
The latter provided the framework for the oldest and largest partnership program—Partnership for 
Peace (PfP)—and served as a foundation for several additional partner relationships with selected 
PfP nations. These included the Individual Partnership Action Plan Program (IPAP), the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC), and the NATO–Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (NUCDP). 
For those nations interested in expanding their relations with NATO and possibly seeking 
membership, the organization offered Intensified Dialogue and even a Membership Action Plan. New 
partnerships also emerged outside of the Euro-Atlantic area in the Greater Middle East (the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) and with such countries as 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, which have partnered successfully with NATO in the war 
in Afghanistan.3 
The introduction of Euro-Atlantic partnerships underwent several major stages of adaptation. The 
Brussels Summit of 1994 officially approved the program, which at that time constituted a novel, 
cooperative framework and “a diplomatic invention of first order.”4 Nonetheless, this flexible 
format of cooperation was hardly able to meet the expectations of most leaders in Eastern Europe 
who sought NATO membership as their ultimate foreign policy goal. Similarly, PfP extended no 
formal guarantees or clear promises for membership as Brussels tried to insure itself against possible 
accusations from Moscow that these partnerships were intended to entice the former Soviet 
satellites into the Western camp. First step toward expansion was taken at the Madrid Summit in 
1997 when three countries from the Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) 
were invited to join NATO. Since then, two additional rounds of expansion occurred in 2004 and 
2009 with a total of nine new members joining the organization. 
Scholars of international alliances do not hold uniform understanding as to the reasons that NATO 
needs these new members and partners, and how these nations benefit from their enhanced 
cooperation with the alliance. Institutionalists argue that alliances expand beyond mere aggregation 
of military capabilities; they serve as security coalitions differing in their purposes and “degree of 
their institutionalization.” Alliances also engage smaller nations to participate in their decision-
making process, thus providing for transparency, consultation, and incentives for cooperative 
strategies.5 NATO membership offered unprecedented security guarantees to the new members 
under Article Five. In contrast, the EAPs do not extend any formal security commitments to their 
participants; they only provide an opportunity for these nations to participate in an enhanced 
security dialogue, to exchange ideas about military transformation and adaptation, to discuss their 
possible contributions to global military operations, and occasionally seek advice on how to handle 
terrorist challenges.6 
                                                
3 For further details about NATO partnerships see Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson 
(eds.) The Power of Partnerships (Palgrave Macmillan, New York; London, 2011). 
4 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the battle for consensus (Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, 
Herndon, Virginia, 1997), p. 83. 
5 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, “Risk, Threat and Security Institutions” in Power and Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World (Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2002), p. 97. 
6 Ryan Hendrickson, “Potential NATO Partners – Political and Military Utility for NATO” in NATO: The Power of 
Partnerships, eds. Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson (Palgrave Macmillan, New York; 
London: 2011), pp. 163-80. 
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Democratic peace theorists justify the extension of new membership or partnership invitations as a 
strategy of reinforcement used by NATO to bring about and stabilize political changes inside these 
new countries, such as the consolidation of the rule of law, democracy, the promotion of human 
rights, and the modernization of civil-military relations in these nations.7 This strategy, known as 
political conditionality, is strictly rewards-based, i.e., it means that if the new members or partners 
comply with the expectations, they will be rewarded for their behavior by the international 
organization. NATO has used both invitations for membership and the extension of various 
partnerships as such rewards. 
Previous studies have shown that the transformation of the military establishment, the 
modernization of civil-military relations, and effective contribution to NATO’s overseas operations 
have been an integral part of NATO’s conditionality. As a result, new members were required to 
undergo significant restructuring and adaptation of their armed forces prior to their admission into 
the organization.8 However, existing literature does not provide much insight into how specifically 
the admission of new members and the introduction of new partnerships affects these nations’ 
decisions to participate more actively in international peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and 
stabilization efforts. The following section will focus on how political conditionality, specifically the 
prospects of membership, has contributed to an effective engagement of new participants in 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarianism. 
 
Membership Prospects as Political Conditionality for Participation in International 
Operations 
When the Partnership for Peace framework was developed in the mid-1990s, every country that 
joined the program signed an individual Peace Framework Document and was required to submit a 
Presentation Document. This requirement exemplified NATO’s early conditionality for participation 
in PfP and, as ethnic violence spiked out of control in the 1990s, multinational peacekeeping was 
recognized as a key area where cooperation was most needed. The scope of these operations 
remained relatively limited—it primarily included humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and search and 
rescue. The first PfP exercise—Cooperative Bridge— took place in Poland in 1994 and included 600 
soldiers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, the Netherlands, Ukraine, UK and the U.S.9 Gradually, all parties understood the need for 
diversification and specialization in the forms of cooperation among individual partners as the 
number of these exercises soared in mid- and late-1990s. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, NATO leadership realized that the PfP framework was insufficient to 
accommodate the aspirations of all participants. In order to distinguish between potential entrants 
and the rest of the partners, NATO leaders officially introduced the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), designed to help aspirant nations prepare for the burdens of membership, review the 
                                                
7 Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in 
Eastern Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 21 (April 2007), p. 126. 
8 Frank Schummelfenning, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 3. 
9  “Exercise Cooperative Bridge 94,” 12 September 1994, NATO Handbook/ NATO e-Library. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8BD9D109-6EB228F2/natolive/news_24256.htm (accessed December 9, 2011). 
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progress of every individual applicant, and provide candid feedback.10 East European states like the 
three Baltic Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia used PfP as a 
stepping stone to join MAP and, thus, upgrade their relationship with NATO in order to receive 
much desired membership invitations. 
Therefore, MAP represented a more sophisticated mechanism of political conditionality introduced 
by NATO officials to improve the aspirants’ transformation and adaptation, but also to stimulate 
their further commitment toward international peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and 
humanitarianism. It also indirectly influenced the decision of the potential entrants to participate in 
international missions due to their expectations to enjoy membership benefits in the future.  
Overall, the plan was considered a success as it led to the 2002 Prague Summit (2004) which decided 
to extend membership invitations to seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe.11 In the 
aftermath of the Summit, an interagency team led by Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO, found that all of them were making efforts to reform and modernize their defense 
establishments as outlined in their individual plans. To ensure that all new allies would remain on 
track with the military reforms, they were asked to submit individual Timetables for the Completion of 
Reforms prior to the signing of Accession Protocols. 
The timetables constituted important mechanisms to enforce NATO’s political conditionality; they 
also represented commitments undertaken by the invitees to guide them through the accession 
process and beyond. These documents also helped inform NATO and the allied parliaments about 
the status of the applicants’ preparedness to meet the responsibilities of membership. Indicators for 
such preparedness included a commitment to spend a minimum of 2% budget appropriations on 
defense. Furthermore, NATO explicitly asked the new members to identify the steps that they had 
undertaken or planned to undertake to reach full interoperability in order to fully participate in 
overseas operations. These included a number of specific measures by the seven invitees to ensure 
that connectivity of air space, the availability of secure communications (voice and data), adequate 
military education, effective training, and national defense planning systems were set in place at the 
time of accession. These technical measures were clearly geared toward more effective participation 
in NATO-led peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and stabilization missions.  
Therefore, key events such as the introduction of PfP and MAP, and the extension membership 
invitations led to these nations’ higher contributions in the subsequent years. For example, PfP 
mobilized additional support for peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia between 1995 
and 1997. Nonetheless, after 1998 NATO partners became fairly inactive on the international arena. 
The decisions of the Washington Summit (1999) and the Prague Summit (2002) once again catalyzed 
additional overseas troop deployments by these countries in 2000 and 2003 as shown in Figure 1 
below. 
NATO Heads of State and Government agreed at the Prague Summit that three of the MAP 
participants (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) were not prepared to meet the responsibilities of 
membership. Nonetheless, they were encouraged to continue with reforms geared toward 
transformation of their civil and military institutions, the implementation of the rule of law, and the 
improvement of their cooperation with international institutions as required by NATO’s 
                                                
10 “An Alliance for the 21st Century,” Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm. (accessed June 5, 2007). 
11 The seven invitees in 2002 were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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conditionality for membership. Albanians, Croatians and Macedonians remained active in the 
international arena and their contributions for NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan surged. As a result, 
Albania and Croatia’s efforts were rewarded with membership invitations at the subsequent NATO 
Summit in Bucharest (2008), while Macedonia was the only holdout, due to a Greek veto related to 
an outstanding dispute over the country’s name. 
 
Figure 1: Deployment of Troops Overseas for Twelve Nations That Were Admitted to NATO in 1999, 2004 and 
2009 (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1995/96 through 
2006/07. 
 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which included all NATO members and PfP partners, was 
designed to serve as a security forum for dialogue and consultation about political and security-
related issues. This multilateral body dealt with cooperation in the areas of peacekeeping operations, 
arms control and proliferation, defense planning, and policy implementations in the context of 
regional conflicts, terrorism, emergency planning, and civil-military cooperation.12 Gradually, new 
tiers of partnerships surfaced within EAPC allowing for a flexible framework of cooperation. Thus, 
the new Council effectively comprised of four distinct categories of partners: (1) Russia and Ukraine 
who upgraded their relations within the framework of the new bilateral Councils; (2) seven EAPs 
whose interest in cooperating with NATO varied substantially and who would be offered Individual 
Partnership Action Plans13; (3) six “advanced” West European NATO partners (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland); and (4) six relatively inactive PfP nations with practically 
                                                
12 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era,” Strategic Forum 206 (March 2004), p. 1. 
13 The seven IPAP nations jointed during different periods of time and included Armenia (December 2005), Azerbaijan 
(May 2005), Bosnia (January 2008), Georgia (October 2004), Kazakhstan (January 2006), Moldova (May 2006), and 
Montenegro (January 2008). 
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no intention in developing individual partnerships (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).14 
The Prague Summit fundamentally revamped NATO’s partnerships in several ways: First, the 
partnerships with Russia and Ukraine were upgraded. The new permanent NATO-Russia Council 
built on the goals and principles of the 1997 Founding Act. In July that same year, the alliance 
signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Ukraine. The dialog with Russia on the issues of counterterrorism was regarded especially promising, 
while for Kiev the partnership presented an opportunity to deepen ties with the alliance. Second, the 
new format of the partnerships with Russia and Ukraine was followed by the introduction of the 
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). IPAPs were geared toward nations that had intent to 
deepen their relationship with NATO but ultimately were unfit to pass the membership 
conditionalities any time soon. Georgia was the first partner to join the new program in 2004, 
followed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova.15 In 2008, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro decided to pursue participation in IPAPs. Additionally, the new individual plans 
introduced an explicit expectation that the partners would participate more actively in the allied 
efforts in Afghanistan. NATO encouraged these countries to identify their own specific areas of 
contributions and provided guidance for military reforms as needed.16 
                                                
14 Jeffrey Simon had offered previous classifications of the PfP participants. For further details see Simon, “Partnership,” 
p. 3. 
15 Georgia is probably the only notable difference in this respect as Tbilisi joined IPAP with clear intention to pursue 
NATO membership. The alliance, on the other hand, remained cognizant of the fact that Georgia was locked into the 
unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and offered Tbilisi IPAP as an alternative to MAP. 
16 “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” NATO Handbook. http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html. (accessed 
June 1, 2011).  









High Level of Participation 
In International Operations 
Low Level of Participation  
in International Operations 


















Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 44
Finally, a new partnership called Intensified Dialogue that included Bosnia, Georgia, and Montenegro, 
was introduced in 2005 an intermediate step toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The Dialogue also 
facilitated joint planning, improved interoperability between allies and their partners, and ensured 
higher partners’ participation in joint operations. Nonetheless, this form of partnership was cautious 
about offering any immediate prospects for membership and, therefore, has had a more limited 
impact on the partners’ decisions to deploy troops overseas.  
The overwhelming evidence suggests that participation of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic partners in 
international peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarian operations is linked to the level of 
institutionalized cooperation between these nations and the alliance as summarized in Figure 2. For 
example, full members and MAP nations that await membership invitation are the most likely 
contributors to NATO’s overseas missions. Furthermore, participants in Intensified Dialogue like 
Georgia, Montenegro and Ukraine are somewhat likely to participate in international operations. 
Alternatively, IPAP nations and other PfP participants (with the exception of the “advanced” West 
European NATO partners) are somewhat unlikely to join NATO-led international operations. 
Therefore, partners’ willingness to maintain enhanced relations with the alliance, determines their 
varying degree of contributions to international operations. 
Nations that participate in PfP but have not upgraded their relationship with the alliance are less 
likely to participate in international peacekeeping, counterterrorism and humanitarianism, as shown 
in the cases of Belarus, Serbia and the Central Asian republics (Figure 3). Kyrgyzstan and Serbia’s 
decisions to deploy troops under a UN mandate in Burundi, Liberia and Sudan (a total of 15-20 
civilian observers) is unrelated to their participation in MAP and has minimal effect on international 
peacekeeping. Alternatively, individualized partnerships (e.g., Intensified Dialogue or MAP) are much 
more likely to contribute to international efforts. This tendency is illustrated by the cases of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, whose participation in Afghanistan and Iraq peaked between 2004 
and 2009 following the introduction of the IPAPs and Intensified Dialogue (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3: Deployment of Troops Overseas by NATO’s PfP Nations (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1999/2000 
through 2009/10. 
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Figure 4: Deployment of Troops Overseas by NATO’s IPAP Participants (per million citizens) 
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Source: The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1999/2000 
through 2009/10. 
 
Furthermore, the Individual Partnership Action Plans constitute a transitional category that offered a 
substantial degree of flexibility to the participants but lacked unity of objectives. For example, 
Georgia’s entry into the program in 2004 was regarded a waiting room preceding Tbilisi’s admission 
into MAP and an opportunity to enhance the country’s membership bid. As a result, the country 
participation in Iraq and Afghanistan increased exponentially between 2005 and 2008 as shown in 
Figure 4. For Azerbaijan, IPAP presented an alternative to MAP because Baku was considered 
ineligible for membership in the foreseeable future due to its substantial democratic deficit. 
Armenia, which joined the program shortly after Azerbaijan, had not declared any expressed 
intentions to pursue NATO membership in the near future, and have decided to maintain low 
overseas troop deployments. Azerbaijan and Armenia have no realistic chances of entering MAP any 
time as long as both nations remain locked in the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Albeit 
for different reasons, the same observation applies to the cases of Bosnia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. 
Ukraine’s fluctuating performance can be attributed the unstable domestic environment and will be 
discussed separately. 
 
Unresolved Disputes with Neighboring Countries as a Restraint for Membership and a 
Disincentive for Participation in International Operations 
The cases of Macedonia and Georgia illustrate that while enhanced cooperation tends to stimulate 
the partners’ involvement in international operations, this process is further complicated by the 
presence of unresolved ethnic, political or territorial disputes with neighboring countries. For 
example, the dispute between Greece and Macedonia dates back to the early 1990s when Athens 
refused to recognize this newly independent nation under its constitutional name, the Republic of 
Macedonia. The argument behind Greece's staunch opposition to Macedonia’s constitutional name 
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is that the name “Macedonia” is historically inseparable from Greek culture, ever since the ancient 
Kingdom of Macedonia which gave rise to Alexander the Great. Despite the fact that the two 
neighboring nations concluded an Interim Agreement in 1995, no permanent settlement has been 
reached since then. As a result, Greece used its veto power in 2008 to block Macedonia’s admission 
into NATO and to halt any further negotiations with the EU. The North Atlantic Council 
reluctantly accepted Greece’s veto despite vehement protests by the United States and other allies. 
In response, Macedonia filed a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice arguing that Greece's 
decision is illegal because it fails to comply with previous agreements between the two neighbors. 
This decision to postpone Macedonia’s invitation into the alliance once again indicates the 
complexity of membership conditionality. The recent judgment of the International Court of Justice 
which found that, by using its veto power, Greece essentially failed to comply with its obligations 
under international law, does not alter significantly the bargaining dynamics.17 U.S. Ambassador in 
Skopje Paul Wohlers signaled once again that the Macedonia’s admission to NATO must be 
preceded by the settlement of its outstanding dispute with Greece in a non-coercive manner.18 
Similar to Macedonia, Georgia’s further integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures is practically 
paralyzed by its outstanding dispute with neighboring Russia over the break-away republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia was among the first to join PfP in March 1994, but it indicated 
no membership aspirations in the 1990s when governments in Tbilisi attempted to carefully balance 
between a pro-Russian and pro-Western foreign policy. The Rose Revolution brought a profound 
change of Tbilisi’s foreign policy orientation. The reformist government led by President Mikhael 
Saakashvili took a course that pursued fundamental institutional reforms, improved transparency, 
reduced corruption, and sought closer integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Recognizing 
Russia’s concerns, NATO acted cautiously and offered Tbilisi an Individual Partnership Action Plan 
in 2004. 
The introduction of the IPAP was followed by large-scale military cooperation between Georgia and 
the United States. By and large the extensive training programs of the Georgian military were funded 
and supervised by Washington and the accomplishments of this cooperation were significant. Prior 
to 2002, the state of Georgia’s armed forces was deplorable—they were a collection of loosely 
organized, poorly disciplined units with corrupt leadership and limited modern combat skills.19 With 
the help of U.S. military aid, Georgia’s participation in international operations increased 
dramatically—within five years Tbilisi had 2,000 troops deployed in the cities of Tikrit, Baghdad and 
Al Kut in Iraq. Furthermore, after 2006 this former Soviet Republic became the largest contributing 
nation among all IPAP nations to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and 
second largest per capita contributor (after the U.S.) in international operations among all NATO 
allies and partners.20 Georgia’s forces in Afghanistan were not merely conducting stationary 
                                                
17 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), 
The International Court of Justice, 5 December 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf. (accessed 
December 5, 2011).  
18 “Wohlers: First the Name; NATO Membership will Follow Then” (Волерс: Прво името, па членство на 
Македонија во НАТО), Denvnik Daily, Skopje, 5 December 2011. 
19 Robert E. Hamilton, “Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 
February 2009. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090203_hamilton_militaryreform.pdf. (accessed June 17, 2011). 
20 Georgia deployed on average about 280 soldiers per million in overseas operations between 2006 and 2008. During 
the same period the United States maintained about 650 military personnel per million, Britain and Slovenia had 
approximately 220-250 soldiers; and NATO’s average contribution was 175 soldiers per million people. It is also worth 
noting that more than half of the allies contributed with less than 100 military personnel per million. For detail see The 
Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2006/07 through 2009/10. 
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peacekeeping, but also patrolled high-risk areas in Kabul and participated in full-scale combat 
operations in the Helmand Province, often with significant U.S. assistance. Tbilisi introduced very 
few caveats for its troops, which is why U.S. commanders preferred to operate with Georgian units 
over those from other partners.21 U.S. military assistance was geared mostly toward the acquisition 
of capabilities to participate in overseas operations and was specifically intended not to enhance any 
Georgian capabilities to fight with Russia or other neighboring countries. 
As a result, Georgia became a preferred partner and potentially a very strong applicant for future 
NATO expansion as the country was admitted to Intensified Dialogue in September 2006. This new 
cooperative framework represented recognition of the headway made by this former Soviet 
Republic. To strengthen its case in favor of NATO membership, Georgia held a referendum on 
January 5, 2008, in which the voters backed its membership bid with overwhelming approval of 
72.5%.22 Georgia drastically increased defense spending to more than five percent of the nation’s 
total budget as a part of its efforts to restructure and improve its armed forces.23 The new resources 
tremendously helped modernize the army with training and equipment that meet NATO standards.  
Nonetheless, the status of the two break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again 
became a major obstacle for its future Euro-Atlantic integration.24 After the break up of the Soviet 
Union, the majority of the population in these autonomous regions remained loyal to Moscow and 
wanted to eventually join the Russian Federation. Multiple diplomatic attempts by President 
Saakashvili to reach a comprehensive agreement reached a stalemate. In the summer of 2008 
Georgia began a military operation in South Ossetia, aimed at repelling the Russian tanks 
approaching the conflict zone in the break-away republic. Russia responded immediately with a full 
scale military invasion in Georgia by air and land, and even launched a cyber attack against online 
media starting August 8, 2008.25 Independent reports have pointed out that both the Russian and 
Georgian sides had contributed to the reciprocal escalation of tension prior to the outbreak of the 
conflict.26 The Russian assault was short-lived, and peace was brokered within a week with the 
mediation of France and the United States. 
The Georgian-Russian conflict of August 2008 had a major impact on Tbilisi’s relations with NATO 
and its future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. First, the war substantially decreased 
Georgia’s chances for NATO membership prior to a final settlement of the status of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. The West expressed sympathy with Georgia’s position regarding the status of 
Abkhazia and Ossetia, but Washington and Brussels recognized that Tbilisi’s progress toward Euro-
Atlantic integration would be contingent upon improved relations with Moscow. In fact, the 
settlement of all territorial disputes with aspirants’ neighbors has always been a core principle that 
guided NATO’s expansion in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Second, the Russians, who have always 
disapproved Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO, were quite pleased with this outcome as it 
provided Moscow with a de facto veto power to block Georgia’s further Euro-Atlantic integration.  
                                                
21 Hamilton, “Georgian,” 3 February 2009. 
22 “Georgia Referendum to Include NATO Membership Question,” Agence France-Presse, Tbilisi, 26 November 2007 and 
“Russia’s NATO Ambassador: Georgia Unqualified to Join NATO,” Agence France-Presse, Moscow, 18 January 2008. 
23 “Georgia to Raise 2007 Defense Spending by $200 mln to $600 mln,” Global Security Online, 29 August 2007. 
24 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are located in Georgia’s North and Northwest close to the border with Russia. Both 
entities broke away from Tbilisi in 1992 and sought protection for independence from Russia. 
25 Johanna Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: the Path to War in Georgia,” in The Guns of August 2008 eds. 
Svante Cornell and Frederick Starr (M. E. Sharpe, New York, 2009), pp. 150-2. 
26 Alima Bissenova, “Foes Say Saakashvili Distorted War Report,” Central Asia-Caucuses Institute Analyst, 14 October 2009. 
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More importantly, the 2008 war had a major impact on the reforms of Georgia’s armed forces. The 
loss of the war to Russia appears to have been a catalyst for re-armament, but also for significant 
doctrinal and personnel reorganization within the Georgian armed forces. As a result, the 
government in Tbilisi focused on completing military reforms at home and decided to minimize its 
overseas deployments following the withdrawal of the 3rd Infantry Brigade from Iraq. The war with 
Russia inadvertently undercut Georgia’s commitment to international peacekeeping as most of the 
military resources were re-directed toward territorial defense. The country once again returned to 
international operations in April 2010 when the 3rd Infantry Brigade was deployed in Afghanistan, 
where the Georgian contingent carried out a full spectrum of security operations side by side with 
the U.S. military.27 As long as NATO membership remains distant, Georgian leadership feels that 
current status quo creates disincentives for Tbilisi to deploy larger contingents overseas in support 
of NATO- or UN-led missions. 
 
Weak Domestic Support as a Restraint on Participation in International Operations 
Finally, strong public support at home may be a decisive factor for partners’ future Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The level of public support for membership varied among the twelve new allies. 
Nonetheless, a wide consensus emerged among their political elites who were able to persuade the 
general public about the utility of NATO membership and the long-term benefits from active 
participation in international operations. Ukraine, however, presents a specific case of cooperation 
with NATO that departs from the general patterns of Euro-Atlantic integration in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This country’s foreign and security policy has been complicated, in part, by the 
heavy divisions between the pro-Western and pro-Russian camps that reflect geographical, political, 
social, and ethnic boundaries. These divisions contributed to highly polarized political elites on key 
issues, such as national security policy and alliance orientation, and effectively paralyzed the nation’s 
Euro-Atlantic integration and also led to a significant drop of Ukrainian participation in international 
operations. 
Ukraine enjoyed a special relationship with NATO in the years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. As previously discussed, Kiev was a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as an active participant 
in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In 1997 Ukraine and NATO signed a Charter on a Distinctive 
Partnership and five years later a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was introduced at the Prague Summit. 
Its purpose was “to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its 
aspirations towards full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.”28 
The Orange Revolution of 2004 changed this dynamic when the new pro-Western President, Prime 
Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament sent a letter to Brussels officially asking NATO to accept 
the country into the Membership Action Plan as a first step on the path to full membership. 
However, this step was met with disapproval and skepticism at home by the pro-Russian opposition 
and a majority of the Ukrainian public. Officials in Kiev and Brussels agreed that the country needed 
a thorough public debate before its entry into the alliance.29 The political change in 2004 also 
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brought new momentum to Ukraine’s preparedness to participate in international peacekeeping, 
counterterrorism, and humanitarian operations. The Yushchenko government adopted a New 
Strategic Defense Doctrine and a New Military Doctrine, in which interoperability with NATO 
forces and command structures was identified as a key area of defense reform so that Kiev could 
meet adequately the needs of the UN and other international organizations.30 Upon the advice of its 
Euro-Atlantic partners, Kiev began to explore its comparative advantages in certain niche 
capabilities such as Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF), Main Defense Force, and Strategic 
Reserves.31 
Unlike the other East European societies, the Ukrainian political elite was never able to forge a 
consensus on its future NATO membership. As a result, the public opposition to NATO 
membership steadily increased in the years following the Orange Revolution as the ratio between 
opponents and supporters of NATO membership reached 2:1 in 2009. This high level of 
disapproval for NATO membership stands in sharp contrast to the rest of Eastern Europe, where 
improved integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures led to increased public support for NATO 
membership.32 As a result, Ukrainian political leadership felt compelled to draw down its military 
contributions to international operations. The presidential elections in February 2010 brought to 
power the pro-Russian and anti-NATO candidate Victor Yanukovych from the Party of the 
Regions, who withdrew Kiev’s application for accession into the MAP. This wavering relationship 
between Ukraine and NATO, coupled with the lack of consensus at home and indecisiveness to 
move forward with the issue of membership, adversely affected military reforms and constrained the 




The cases of Georgia and Ukraine illustrate how NATO’s individual partnerships could effectively 
engage the partner countries to increase their international deployments in support of various 
missions led by international organizations or multinational coalitions. NATO persuaded Kiev to 
invest significant efforts into “strategic” peacekeeping, thus boosting the nation’s international 
deployments between 2000 and 2006. Georgia, on the other hand, took advantage of U.S. military 
assistance after 2005 to improve its peacekeeping capabilities, thus becoming a major contributor in 
Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, sources of domestic opposition or unsettled disputes with neighbors can effectively 
paralyze the improvement of relations between the alliance and its partners, which ultimately reduces 
the partners’ participation in various NATO and UN-led overseas missions. In the case of Ukraine, 
the unpopularity of NATO membership dissuaded the Yanukovych government from further 
engagement in NATO-led international operations. Similarly, Georgia’s active involvement in 
international peacekeeping surged after the United States started providing military aid and 
mentorship. However, the conflict with Moscow in 2008 convinced the military and political 
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leadership in Tbilisi that traditional territorial defense should once again remain a core priority in the 
Caucasus. 
These observations bear several theoretical and policy implications. First, the security guarantees 
extended by NATO membership represent the highest reward for prospective members. Thus, 
membership prospects present robust stimuli for partner nations to adapt their armed forces by the 
organization’s standards and participate actively in its overseas operations. Second, partnerships with 
international security organizations can be effective tools in engaging new partners, persuading 
nations to participate in international military and political efforts and, ultimately, building broader 
international coalitions for military and civilian campaigns. At the same time, however, NATO 
partnerships have limited mechanisms at hand to influence the participation of non-members, 
especially countries with divided societies and political elites, competing allegiances at home, and 
stubborn neighbors. Third, applying a one-size-fits-all approach to all NATO partnerships, 
nonetheless, would be inappropriate and impractical. While EAPC and PfP present a viable 
framework for cooperation, only individual partnerships customized to meet each country’s needs 
for cooperation can successfully persuade partners to cooperate more actively with international 
organizations. Finally, on the policy side, NATO’s regional or global partnerships can be useful and 
effective tools for engaging new partners in a meaningful “intensified” dialogue. Scholars and policy 
makers should be cognizant of the limitations emanating from this form of security cooperation and, 
therefore, have realistic expectations about its success in the future. 
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